Epistemic evaluation and the aim of belief by Nolfi, Kate
EPISTEMIC EVALUATION AND THE AIM OF BELIEF 
 
Kate Nolfi 
 
A thesis submitted to the faculty of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in 
partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in the Department 
of Philosophy. 
 
Chapel Hill 
2010 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Approved by: 
 
 Ram Neta 
 
 Matthew Kotzen 
 
 William Lycan 
ii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2010 
Kate Nolfi 
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED 
iii 
ABSTRACT 
 
Kate Nolfi: Epistemic Evaluation and the Aim of Belief 
(Under the direction of Ram Neta) 
 
In this paper, I articulate a popular and, I think, promising methodological 
approach to developing an account of epistemic evaluation.  I then sketch the account of 
epistemic evaluation that I argue results from properly implementing this methodological 
approach. In so doing, I argue that if one accepts the methodological approach I articulate 
here, then one should also accept that the constitutive aim of belief is not, as many 
philosophers have assumed, appropriately cashed out in terms of truth.  Rather, one 
should endorse the claim that beliefs aim at being well-suited to serve in practical 
reasoning that yields successful action.  Finally, I briefly address two lines of resistance 
to the pragmatically driven characterization of the constitutive aim of belief and the 
resulting account of epistemic evaluation that I develop here. 
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 Introduction 
 
In this paper, I aim to articulate a methodological approach to epistemological 
inquiry that I take to be relatively popular, at least in its broadest formulation, among 
contemporary epistemologists.  I rely heavily on the work of Ernest Sosa in articulating 
this methodological approach as Sosa’s work explicitly and transparently (relatively 
speaking) attempts to implement the methodology on offer here.  I will not, however, 
offer a defense of this methodological approach in this paper.  Instead, I go on to develop 
an account of epistemic evaluation by carefully implementing the methodology 
articulated here.  However, the account of epistemic evaluation that I argue results from 
carefully implementing the methodological approach on offer here characterizes 
epistemic evaluation in pragmatic terms rather than in terms of a truth-goal.  Finally, I 
defend this account against two related lines of objection that the epistemologist 
sympathetic to an account cashing out epistemic evaluation in terms of truth might level 
against the pragmatically-driven account I develop below.  In so doing, I hope to show 
that the epistemologist who endorses the methodology articulated here should prefer the 
pragmatically-driven account of epistemic evaluation that I develop in what follows over 
a more traditional account cashing out epistemic evaluation in terms of a truth-goal.  So, 
if one accepts this methodological approach to epistemological inquiry, then one should 
also accept the account of epistemic evaluation that I advance here.
 1. Articulating a Methodological Approach 
 
 
1.1 
The methodological approach that I pursue in what follows takes as its starting 
point that beliefs are appropriately understood as a kind of performance.  As a result, the 
methodology on offer here recommends that the epistemologist ground her account of 
specifically epistemic evaluation—evaluation of belief—in an account of performances 
and performance evaluation given in general terms.  In this spirit, I aim here to lay the 
foundation for an account of epistemic evaluation by articulating Sosa’s account of 
performances and performance evaluation.  
Sosa takes the performance that an archer gives in shooting an arrow at a target as 
a paradigm case in his own discussions.  However, it is important to note that Sosa 
understands the notion of a performance quite broadly.1  Thus, the heart, in pumping 
blood, is engaged in a kind of performance and, similarly, for Sosa, beliefs are 
                                                
1 It may be helpful here to explicitly distinguish two types of performers who give or 
engage in performances: organisms (e.g. the archer, the dancer) and systems (e.g. the 
circulatory system, the cognitive system) operating within an organism.  It may be right 
to say that a performance given by a performer of the first sort inherits its constitutive 
aim from the performer’s aim in giving the performance.  However, I suggest that, in the 
case where the performer is of the second sort, the aim of the performer’s particular 
performance is derived from the purpose or function of the performing system operating 
within the organism. 
 
3 
performances of the cognitive system.2  Specifically, belief or believing is a performance 
that is the product of the operation of a cognitive system within an organism and so what 
it is to be a belief is just, on Sosa’s view, to be a performance of the cognitive system of 
some organism.   
Characterized in the most basic terms, performances are actions or behaviors that 
aim to achieve some purpose or end.  Any particular performance is the kind of 
performance that it is in virtue of having the particular aim that it does.  The archer’s 
shot, for example, aims to hit the target.  The heart’s beating aims, let’s say, to circulate 
blood.3  Moreover, the archer’s shot counts as a shot (rather than a mere release of the 
arrow from the bow) in virtue of its being aimed at hitting the target.  Similarly, part of 
what it is to be heartbeat is to be a performance aimed at circulating blood through an 
organism.4  The aim of a performance is at least partially constitutive of that 
performance’s being the kind of performance that it is.  Put in other terms, a performance 
is not just any doing, but a doing in order to or for the purpose of Φ.  
Often, we can discover the constitutive aim, end, or purpose of a particular type of 
performance by coming to understand when and why performers who give that kind of 
performance do so.  We discover that an archer’s shot aims to hit the target by 
                                                
2 Thus, although his examples (e.g. the archer, the dancer) do not always make this point 
clear, taking belief to be a kind of performance does not commit the epistemologist 
endorsing this methodology to epistemic voluntarism. 
3 It is worth pointing out that the aim of the heart’s beating is probably a great deal more 
complex than I have suggested here.  
 
4 Organ systems, I take it, are identified by their proper function and so an organ system 
cannot have multiple functions (although, of course, two organ systems—each 
characterized in functional terms—might well be realized in some of the same physical 
structures).  As a result, performances of an organ system will have a single, constitutive 
aim, which derives from the proper function of the performing system.  
4 
discovering when and why archers shoot arrows.  Similarly, we discover that the heart’s 
beating aims to pump blood by discovering when and why organisms have circulatory 
systems (i.e. by discovering the way in which the circulatory system serves to maintain or 
increase the biological fitness of the organism within which it operates).  And so, because 
she understands beliefs as performances of the cognitive system, the epistemologist 
adopting the methodology I am developing here maintains that we discover the 
constitutive aim of belief by discovering the way in which the cognitive system serves to 
increase or maintain the biological fitness of the organism within which it operates. 
 
1.2 
The account of performance evaluation that I adopt in what follows maintains 
that, since performances are identified as the particular kind of performance that they are 
by their constitutive aims, performances are always appropriately evaluated in reference 
to their aims.  In an effort to flesh out this thesis, Sosa proposes that performances have 
AAA normative structure.  That is, performances are appropriately evaluated along three 
dimensions: accuracy, adroitness, and aptness.5  Most broadly construed, the degree to 
which a performance is accurate is simply the degree to which the performance 
successfully meets its aim.  The degree to which a performance is adroit is just the degree 
to which the performance manifests skill on the part of the performer.  Finally, the degree 
to which a performance is apt is the degree to which the performance is accurate because 
it is adroit.  That is, a performance is apt just in case the performance meets its aim 
because it manifests the performer’s skill and so if a performance is apt, then it is 
                                                
5 See Sosa, E. (2007), Lecture 2: A Virtue Epistemology, pp. 22-45.  
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appropriate to attribute the success of the performance to the performer since the 
performer’s skill causes the performance to be successful.   
Consider Sosa’s archer.6  The archer’s performance is accurate if he hits his 
target, his performance is adroit if it manifests the archer’s skill in executing the shot, and 
the performance is apt just in case the archer’s arrow hits the target because of his skill in 
executing the shot.  If the archer aims and then releases the arrow from the bow in a 
skillful manner (so that, under normal conditions, the arrow would have hit the target), 
but an unexpected gust of wind blows the arrow off course and so the arrow fails to hit 
the target, then the archer’s shot is adroit but not accurate and so not apt.  If, on the other 
hand, a novice aims and releases the arrow without skill, but manages to hit the target by 
a stroke of luck (let us say that an unexpected gust of wind blows the arrow onto a course 
that lands the arrow in the center of the target), then the novice’s shot is accurate, but not 
adroit and so not apt.  Finally, we might imagine that the archer aims and releases his 
arrow with skill, an unexpected gust a wind blows the arrow off its original course, but 
then a second unexpected gust of wind blows the arrow back on course and so the arrow 
hits the target.  In this case, the archer’s shot is both accurate and adroit.  However, the 
archer’s shot fails to be apt because the archer’s skill does not cause (or is not sufficient 
to cause) the archer’s arrow to hit the target—the second unexpected gust of wind plays a 
crucial role in causing the arrow to hit the target. 
Consider now the case where the performer is a system operating within a larger 
organism.  In this sort of case, it is when the system is performing or functioning 
properly, that its performances succeed in meeting their aim.  The circulatory system, for 
                                                
6 See pages 22-23 of Sosa (2007) for Sosa’s discussion of the archer. 
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example, is functioning or performing properly (and so its performances are accurate) to 
the degree that the heart’s beating succeeds in pumping blood.7  The heart’s beating will 
be adroit to the degree that the heart’s beating occurs in such a way (i.e. with the proper 
frequency and force) so as to be well suited to circulating blood throughout the body.  
Finally, the heart’s beating will be apt if it succeeds in pumping blood throughout the 
body as a result of proceeding in a way that is well suited to this task, rather than by some 
fluke or stroke of luck.  
The epistemologist pursuing the approach I have been developing here will apply 
the account of the accuracy, adroitness, and aptness articulated above to the case of belief 
and then employ the resulting account of epistemic evaluation in developing accounts of 
knowledge and justification.8  In this vein, the epistemologist endorsing the methodology 
on offer here maintains that justified belief is just adroit belief.  That is, justified belief is 
belief that results from a cognitive process that reliably, generally, or under normal 
circumstances produces beliefs that meet their constitutive aim.  Sosa, for example, 
maintains that a belief is justified if and only if it manifests epistemic virtue, and so an 
account of the epistemic virtues will explain which of our beliefs are justified and why.9  
Recalling what it takes for a habit to count as an virtue or skill, a subject’s belief that P 
will be justified when the subject’s coming or continuing to believe that P is the result of 
a cognitive habit that, generally speaking or under normal conditions, produces accurate 
                                                
7 It is worth making explicit that this use of the term accuracy is somewhat simulative, 
and so the reader should not be thrown by the seeming awkwardness of the claim that a 
performance of the circulatory system is accurate. 
 
8 Again, see pages 22-23 of Sosa (2007) or Sosa (2001). 
 
9 Therefore, on Sosa’s picture, epistemic virtue is explanatorily prior to justified belief 
and, thus, knowledge.   
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belief.  A belief is accurate to the extent that, as a performance, it meets its aim and so, on 
most views (Sosa’s included) accurate belief is just true belief.  So, for Sosa, S is justified 
in believing that P just when her belief that P results from the operation of a cognitive 
habit that reliably engenders true belief. 
The epistemologist adopting the methodological approach on offer here goes on 
to propose that knowledge is simply apt belief.  So, a subject, S, has animal knowledge 
that P just in case S believes that P, S’s belief that P is accurate (which, recall, on most 
views is just to say that the belief is true), S’s belief that P is adroit, and S’s belief that P 
is accurate because it is adroit.  The account of epistemic evaluation that results from the 
application of this methodological approach to epistemological inquiry vindicates the 
intuition that knowledge requires justification.  Since the epistemologist adopting the 
methodology developed here cashes out justified belief in terms of adroit belief—belief 
that manifests epistemic virtue or cognitive skill; belief produced by a cognitive process 
that reliably generates accurate belief—justification, on the resulting picture, is a 
necessary condition for knowledge.  Additionally, by understanding knowledge as apt 
belief, this account excludes Gettier cases from the domain of knowledge by requiring 
that the truth of S’s belief that P result from so as be explainable by an exercise of S’s 
epistemic virtue in order for S’s belief that P to count as knowledge.10 
                                                
10 In certain texts, when presenting his account of knowledge, Sosa discusses safe belief.  
On Sosa’s view, a belief is safe when it could not easily have been false.  More precisely, 
S’s belief that P is safe just in case S would not have believed P if P had not been true.  
Sosa sometimes seems to suggest that safety is required for knowledge.  However, Sosa 
is perhaps more charitably interpreted as suggesting not that safety itself is a necessary 
condition for knowledge, but rather that safety is a good indicator of adroitness and so, 
since animal knowledge require adroit belief, safety is a good indicator of one necessary 
condition for knowledge.  Given Sosa’s account of adroit belief as belief that manifests 
epistemic virtue and Sosa’s account of what it takes for a cognitive habit to count as an 
8 
1.3 
On the methodological approach that I have been developing here, epistemology 
is, most essentially, in the business of supplying an account of epistemic evaluation—an 
account of how to appropriately evaluate beliefs, understood as the performances of the 
cognitive system.  Since all performances are appropriately evaluated with reference to 
their constitutive aims, the first task facing the epistemologist adopting the methodology 
on offer here is the task of identifying the aim of the performances of the cognitive 
system.  Identifying this aim involves identifying the particular job or function that the 
cognitive system performs in maintaining or enhancing the biological fitness of the 
organism within which it operates.  Thus, this first task is an empirical one: just as the 
biologist discovers the purpose or function of the circulatory system (composed of the 
heart, arteries, veins, etc.) by investigating real circulatory systems operating within 
organisms, so to the epistemologist begins her inquiry by studying cognitive systems 
operating within organisms in an effort to discover how the cognitive system can and 
does help to maintain or enhance the biological fitness of the organism.11 
                                                                                                                                            
epistemic virtue, adroit beliefs will be safe and most safe beliefs will be adroit.  However, 
it is possible for a belief to be safe and true, but fail to be adroit and so fail to meet the 
criterion for animal knowledge.  
 
11 As Alvin Plantinga has pointed out, the notion of proper function is ambiguous 
between something like the function that the system was designed to perform and the 
function that the system currently performs.  I adopt the second of these two 
interpretations here and so maintain that while the function that a system is designed to 
perform might well provide some evidence for the proper function of the system in 
question, the proper function of the system need not be identical or even similar to the 
function that the system was designed to perform.  The proper function of a system is 
given by the particular job or purpose that the system currently performs in order to 
increase or maintain the biological function of the organism within which it operates. 
9 
Armed with suitably detailed characterization of the way in which the 
performance or functioning of the cognitive system contributes to the biological fitness of 
the organism within which it operates and, derivatively, a detailed account of the aim of 
our cognitive performances, the epistemologist can work from the AAA normative 
structure of performances to develop a suitably detailed account of epistemic evaluation.  
A performance is appropriately evaluated as accurate just in case that performance meets 
its aim, and so the epistemologist can say precisely what it takes for a cognitive 
performance, a belief, to be accurate by referring back to her characterization of the aim 
of the cognitive system.  Similarly, performances are appropriately evaluated as adroit 
when they result from a habit or process that reliably generates performances that meet 
their aim.  So, the epistemologist develops an account of cognitive skill and, in so doing, 
an account of epistemic adroitness by, again, looking out into the world to see which of 
our cognitive processes reliably produce beliefs that meet their performative aim.  At this 
stage as well, then, the epistemologist’s project is, at least in part, an empirical one.  
Nevertheless, in developing an account of cognitive skill, and thus an account of 
epistemic justification, the epistemologist is engaged in the project of identifying those 
cognitive processes the performing of which is worth cultivating.  The epistemologist 
adopting the methodology developed here is not engaged in a merely descriptive project.  
Rather, she is in the business of making recommendations that carry full-blooded 
normative force with respect to what we should believe and which ways of forming 
beliefs we should adopt ourselves and try to cultivate in others. 
 
 
10 
1.4 
Although I do not aim to defend it here, the methodological approach to 
epistemological inquiry that I have outlined above has certain appealing features that are 
worth briefly mentioning.  First, in accepting this methodological approach, the 
epistemologist sets herself a well-defined project and adopts a clear strategy toward this 
end.  The epistemologist aims to give an account of how one can appropriately evaluate 
beliefs, understood as performances of the cognitive system.  Toward this end, the 
epistemologist must begin by characterizing the constitutive aim or goal of our cognitive 
performances.  Then, she is equipped to give an account of the dimensions along which 
we can appropriately evaluate beliefs by referencing this performative aim.  Moreover, on 
such an approach, the normative force of epistemic evaluation is relatively easy to 
explain:  epistemic evaluation has normative force because beliefs constitutively aim at a 
certain goal.  Perhaps for precisely this reason, many contemporary epistemologists seem 
to endorse this methodological approach to epistemic inquiry, at least in its broadest 
formulation.12 
Additionally, the methodological approach I have developed here is 
naturalistically acceptable.  Implementing this approach involves characterizing the 
constitutive aim of belief in a way that is directly responsive to empirical data regarding 
the ways in which the cognitive system operating within an organism serves to increase 
or maintain the biological fitness of the organism.  As a result, this methodological 
approach sets empirical standards that any acceptable account of epistemic evaluation 
                                                
12 It seems to me, for example, that Nishi Shah and David Velleman adopt, at least in 
broad outline, something like the methodological approach that I have been developing 
here.  
11 
will have to meet.  Specifically, according to the proposed methodology, any account of 
epistemic evaluation must characterize the constitutive aim of belief in a way that is, at 
the very least, consistent with empirical data regarding how the performances of the 
cognitive system serve to increase or maintain the biological fitness of the organism in 
which that system operates. 
Furthermore, the sort of empirically driven approach I have outlined above is 
well-justified by its success in other domains.  In particular, the strategy that the 
epistemologist taking on this methodology adopts in her inquiry is, in broad outline, the 
same as the strategy that the biologist or medical researcher adopts, with marked success, 
in her efforts to understand other organ systems in the human body (e.g. the circulatory 
system).  Thus, the approach to epistemological inquiry I have outlined above serves to 
unify the project of developing an account of specifically epistemic evaluation—an 
account of the evaluation of the performances of our cognitive systems—with what I take 
to be similar projects in biology and medicine. 
 
 2. Implementing the Proposed Methodology: An Account of Epistemic Evaluation 
 
In this section, I aim to articulate the account of epistemic evaluation that I argue 
results from implementing the methodology outlined above.  Specifically, I propose here 
that in carrying out this methodological approach, one is led to conclude that the 
constitutive aim or goal of our cognitive performances—i.e. beliefs—is to be well-suited 
to serve as input to practical reasoning that yields successful action, and so beliefs are 
appropriately evaluated with reference to this aim.  Before I defend my claim that 
implementing the methodological approach outlined above yields that the aim of our 
cognitive performances is to supply input to practical reasoning that leads to successful 
action, it will be helpful to spell out this proposal in greater detail.   
First, let me try to make clear what it takes, on my view, for a belief to serve as 
input to practical reasoning.  Practical reason, as I am conceiving of it here, is just the 
process through which beliefs interact with desires or preferences to generate intentions 
for action and so, generally, to generate actions themselves.  Thus, for a subject’s belief 
to serve as input to practical reason is for that belief to interact with desires or preferences 
such that the belief plays a role in shaping or exerts influence over the subject’s 
subsequent intention(s) to act.  A subject’s belief that P will be well-suited to serve as 
input to practical reasoning to the degree that, if the belief that P were to play a role in 
shaping the subject’s intentions and so her actions, the subject would be led to perform 
13 
actions which would be successful in normal worlds.13  The degree to which an action is 
successful, on my view, is just the degree to which it satisfies whichever desires or 
preferences the subject’s intention to act was aimed to satisfy.14  Therefore, the degree to 
which a subject’s belief is well-suited to serve as input to practical reasoning that yields 
successful action—and, thus, the degree to which a belief, understood as a cognitive 
performance, meets its aim—is just the degree to which that belief can inform action in a 
way that leads to the satisfaction of the subject’s desires or preferences in a normal world.    
 
2.1 
Recall that, on the methodological approach to epistemological inquiry that I am 
adopting here, the first task facing the epistemologist developing an account of epistemic 
evaluation is the task of identifying the aim of our cognitive performances.  Moreover, 
the epistemologist identifies the aim of our cognitive performances by first discovering 
how the performances of the cognitive system within an organism can and do contribute 
to the biological fitness of the organism.  One discovers how any particular system 
operating within an organism contributes to the biological fitness of that organism by 
observing the ways in which the operation of the system in question enables the organism 
to cope with its natural environment.  Thus, to determine the function of the cognitive 
system, and so the aim of cognitive performances, one must determine out how cognitive 
                                                
13 Relativizing to normal worlds as I have done here is a standard externalist move (see, 
for example, Goldman, A. (1986), chapter 5).  Generally, this move serves to free the 
reliabilist from being committed to the claim that brains in vats, for example, are never 
justified since none of their cognitive processes reliably generate true beliefs.  
Relativizing to normal worlds operates differently in the account of epistemic evaluation 
that I develop here, but the motivation for the move is similar.   
 
14 This result follows from understanding practical reasoning as an organ system with the 
proper function of satisfying desires. 
14 
systems operating within organisms help these organisms cope with their natural 
environment in a way that enhances or maintains biological fitness.15    
In implementing this methodological approach, one determines what it takes for 
the human being to negotiate her environment effectively (in a way that conducive to 
biological fitness) in order to discover how the cognitive system contributes to the human 
being’s ability to cope with her environment.  For an organism to achieve biological 
fitness in her natural environment, the organism’s behavior must be calibrated to the 
various features of the environment.  In cases where an organism’s environment is 
uniform or predictable it is possible, and often quite effective, for the organism to be 
hard-wired (so to speak) to respond to particular stimuli with a fixed set of behaviors.  
For example, many animals grow winter coats as the days grow shorter since, in their 
natural environments, these animals need protection from the cold during the period of 
the year when the days are short.  Having a winter coat is conducive to the biological 
fitness of these animals in their natural environments precisely because the growth of the 
winter coat is calibrated to various features of the environment (i.e. the number of hours 
of daylight).  However, if the environment in which these animals were living were to 
undergo significant change of a certain sort—say the average temperature during the 
winter months rose —these animals would not be capable of adapting the growth of their 
winter coats to maintain biological fitness.    
                                                
15 It is, of course, an empirical question how the operation of the cognitive system helps 
an organism cope with her environment, and so further empirical investigation may show 
that the answer to this question that I advance here falls short in certain respects.  That 
said, I do believe and will make some effort to show that the empirical data here better 
supports the account that I develop in this section than the traditionally accepted view 
that cashes out the aim of the cognitive system in terms of truth.    
15 
The human environment, more so than other organisms’ natural environment, is 
exceedingly variable and unpredictable.  In order to survive and flourish in a variable and 
unpredictable environment, an organism must be able to select which behaviors to 
perform at any given time in a way that is actively and flexibly sensitive to or informed by 
the current state of her environment.  So, an organism that achieves biological fitness in a 
variable and unpredictable environment must be equipped with a mechanism for selecting 
an appropriate behavioral response in a variety of different situations.  Such a mechanism 
will have to take as input information about the environment and information about the 
organism’s needs, and on the basis of this information generate a behavioral response to 
the situation at hand that helps the organism meet these needs given the current state of 
the environment.  Practical reasoning, as I understand it, is just this mechanism.  The 
cognitive system has the function or job of generating the first sort of input to practical 
reasoning and the conative system has the function of generating the second sort of input 
to practical reasoning.16   
As I have characterized the mechanism of practical reasoning here, the aim of 
practical reasoning is to select a behavioral response to any given stimulus that will 
satisfy certain of the organism’s desires.  The cognitive system serves to supply 
representations of the current state of the organism’s environment as input to the 
mechanism of practical reasoning.  As a result, the proper function of cognitive system is 
to supply input to this mechanism that is well-suited to inform behavior in a way that, 
                                                
16 Human desires do not always express biological needs the satisfaction of which will 
maintain or increase fitness. However, perhaps we should say that the function of the 
conative system, and so the aim of performances of this system (e.g. desires), is to 
represent or express needs of the organism, the satisfaction of which would, in fact, 
maintain or increase biological fitness. 
16 
given the current environment, leads the organism to satisfy her desires or needs.  In turn, 
the performances of the cognitive system aim to serve as input to practical reasoning that 
yields successful action.   
 
2.2 
I have tried to show that implementing the methodological approach outlined 
above yields that the aim of our cognitive performances is to supply input to practical 
reasoning that engenders successful action rather than to represent truths.  If I am right 
here, then, since, on the proposed methodology, performances are evaluated with respect 
to their aims, epistemic evaluation must be cashed out in terms of beliefs being well-
suited to serve as input to practical reasoning that engenders successful action rather than 
in terms of truth.  In what follows, I implement the second step of the methodological 
approach sketched above in an effort to outline such an account of epistemic evaluation. 
Recall that, on the approach I am adopting here, all performances have AAA 
normative structure.  A performance is accurate to the degree that the performance meets 
its aim.  So, on the account of epistemic evaluation that I am developing here, a cognitive 
performance—a belief—is accurate to the degree that the performance is well-suited to 
serve as input to practical reasoning that yields successful action.  A performance is 
adroit to the degree that it manifests skill.  So, a cognitive performance will be adroit to 
the degree that it manifests cognitive skill.  What it takes for a cognitive process or habit 
to count as a cognitive skill is for the cognitive process in question to reliably produce 
performances that meet their constitutive aim.  Thus, on the view I am developing here, a 
cognitive process counts as a cognitive skill and so will be sanctioned by epistemic norms 
just in case it reliably produces beliefs that serve as input to practical reasoning that 
17 
yields successful action.17  So, a belief is adroit when it results from the operation of a 
cognitive process that reliably produces beliefs that serve as input to practical reasoning 
yielding successful action.  Following Sosa, I suggest that justified belief is just adroit 
belief and so, on my view, a belief is justified when it is the product of a cognitive 
process that reliably produces beliefs that are well-suited to serve as input to practical 
reasoning that engenders successful action.18   
Recall that a performance is apt when the performance is accurate because or as a 
result of being adroit.  Thus, a cognitive performance is apt just in case it is well-suited to 
serve as input to practical reasoning that yields successful action as a result of being the 
product of a cognitive habit that reliably produces beliefs that are well-suited to serve as 
input to practical reason that issues in successful action.  Again following Sosa, I propose 
that an account of apt belief serves as an account of knowledge.19  So, on my view, a 
belief counts as knowledge just in the case that belief is well-suited to serve as input to 
practical reasoning issuing in successful action as a result of having been produced by a 
cognitive process that reliably produces beliefs that meet this aim. 
 
                                                
17 Reliability is, of course, a matter of degree here, although I will, for the sake of clarity 
and simplicity, generally gloss over this point in discussion that follows. 
 
18 I am inclined to think that a belief is rational if and only if it is justified and so I would 
suggest that a belief is held rationally just in case the belief is adroit. 
 
19 I suggest here that the human knowledge is properly characterized as apt belief (what 
Sosa identifies as animal knowledge).  However, after identifying apt belief as animal 
knowledge, Sosa goes on to develop an account of a second and more demanding kind of 
knowledge: reflective knowledge.  For Sosa, human knowledge is always reflective 
knowledge or apt belief aptly noted, and so is more demanding that mere animal 
knowledge or apt belief.  I do not find the motivation for this move compelling.  Thus, I 
resist Sosa’s claim that human knowledge should be characterized as reflective 
knowledge or apt belief aptly noted.   
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2.3  
It is worth pointing out that the account of the aim of our cognitive system I have 
developed here is more in line with many of our considered intuitions about cognitive 
performance than accounts cashing out the constitutive aim of our cognitive system in 
terms of truth.  It is entirely consistent with my account that sometimes—perhaps even in 
the vast majority of cases—the cognitive system will have to generate beliefs that are 
true, approximately true, or true in the right respects in order to supply input to practical 
reasoning that yields successful action.20  Nevertheless, it is a mistake to think that the 
aim of our cognitive performances is truth (or even approximate truth, or truth in the right 
respects).  One reason this move is a mistake is that there may well be cases in which, 
perhaps because of the nature of our capacity for practical reasoning or perhaps because 
of certain features of our current environment, a belief that is false is particularly well-
suited to serve as input to practical reasoning yielding successful action.   
 For example, Newtonian mechanics is, strictly speaking, false.  Nevertheless, 
beliefs about how object are likely to move that conform to Newtonian mechanics are 
well-suited to inform our actions in a way that engenders success.  Perhaps the talented 
baseball outfielder is able to catch a fly ball because beliefs conforming to Newtonian 
mechanics inform his behavior.  Similarly, the engineer employs beliefs conforming to 
Newtonian mechanics in designing a bridge that will remain structurally sound through 
an earthquake.  Moreover, in each of these cases it seems plausible that, had the subjects’ 
beliefs conformed instead with the (presumably true) general theory of relativity, the 
                                                
20 In fact, I suspect that it is rarely the case that beliefs that are completely true are well-
suited to serve as input to practical reasoning.  However, it may be that beliefs that are 
approximately true or true in the right respects are quite often extremely well-suited to 
serve as input to practical reasoning.   
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subjects would, perhaps because of the complexity of this theory, have been ill-equipped 
to act in a way that satisfied his or her preferences or desires.  In each of these cases, it is 
intuitive to say that the beliefs in question, although false, are the best beliefs that the 
subject could have had.  The account I am advancing of the aim of our cognitive 
performances explains why these beliefs are, in fact, the best beliefs that our subjects 
could have had.  These beliefs, in each case, are incredibly well-suited to serve as input to 
practical reasoning that yields successful action.  Now the epistemologist cashing out the 
aim of cognitive performances in terms of truth may well be able to explain our intuitions 
here.  After all, Newtonian mechanics is approximately true or, perhaps, true in the right 
respects.  However, the explanation that this epistemologist can offer, if successful at all, 
will certainly involve far more fancy philosophical footwork than the explanation that the 
account I am advancing here supplies.  
Consider now the case of an athlete—a swimmer, let’s say—who believes that 
she has a reasonable chance of winning a particular race.  We can imagine, however, that 
the relevant empirical data strongly suggests that our athlete is unlikely to win the race 
(the other competitors in the race have consistently made better times in this event, the 
other competitors have been training just as hard for the race, etc.).  Moreover, we can 
imagine that the swimmer maintains her belief that she has a reasonable chance of 
winning the race despite her being fully aware of the evidence suggesting otherwise.  
Research has shown that people who have somewhat unrealistic expectations regarding 
their own performance are overwhelmingly likely to perform better than matched peers 
with a more realistic assessment of their own potential.  So, we can easily imagine that 
our swimmer, having convinced herself that she has a real shot at winning the race, goes 
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on to swim faster than she would have if she had believed, as the available evidence had 
suggested, that she was thoroughly unlikely to win.21  Perhaps, she wins the race after all 
or perhaps she merely swims a personal best time for that event or places a great deal 
higher than the relevant statistics suggested that she would.  In any case, the athlete’s 
false belief that she has a good chance of winning the race engenders successful action 
more effectively than the corresponding true belief would.   
Moreover, the swimmer’s false belief is, I suspect, precisely the belief that we 
think she should have regarding her own chances of winning.  We would not, for 
example, encourage the swimmer to adopt a more realistic belief regarding her own 
chances of winning the race.  Rather, we encourage precisely the sort of positive thinking 
that might have lead the swimmer to form her unrealistic belief in the first place.  Not 
only do we think it is preferable, all things considered, that the swimmer have a 
somewhat unrealistic belief regarding her own chances of winning, but we are disinclined 
to say, in a manner that carries normative weight, that there is any respect in which the 
swimmer goes wrong in believing as she does.22   
I do not mean to suggest here that truth is always irrelevant to the epistemic status 
of a belief.  In many cases, as a matter of contingent fact, it might well turn out that the 
sorts of beliefs that are best suited to serve as input to practical reasoning toward 
successful action are true beliefs.  I merely suggest here that 1) it is a mistake to 
                                                
21 Of course, if our swimmer’s assessment of her own chances of winning are too 
unrealistic, then the belief is likely to be ill-suited to serving as input to practical 
reasoning yielding successful action since, for example, in such a case the swimmer will 
likely be incredibly disappointed by the results of the race.  
 
22 Some epistemologists might be inclined to say that this swimmer is epistemically 
irrational.  I hope that what I say below in Section 3.2 will make clear why it is a mistake 
to analyze the swimmer’s case in this way. 
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characterize the aim of cognitive performances in terms of truth, and, as a result, 2) that 
there are, at least in principle, cases where there is nothing bad, epistemically speaking, to 
be said about an organism’s holding a belief that is false.  Put another way, on the view I 
am advancing here, it is, at least in principle, possible that there are false beliefs that, 
from an epistemic point of view, we should, nevertheless, hold, even in cases where a fair 
and thorough survey of the available evidence suggests to us that these beliefs are false.  I 
take it that the swimmer’s unrealistic estimation of her own chances of winning the race, 
for example, is a belief of just this sort.  An account characterizing the aim of our 
cognitive performances in terms of truth is ill-equipped to make sense of these sorts of 
cases.  Thus, one has good reason to reject the move to characterize the aim of belief in 
terms of truth and, instead, adopt a pragmatically-driven characterization of the aim of 
belief like the one I develop above. 
More fundamentally, the move to characterize the aim of belief in terms of truth is 
a mistake because it signifies a failure to appropriately ground one’s account of the aim 
of our cognitive performances, and so the normative force of epistemic evaluation in the 
particular job or function that the cognitive system operating within an organism 
performs in contributing to the biological fitness of that organism. I take the case of the 
swimmer with an unrealistic opinion of her own chances of winning to show that forming 
true, almost true, true-in-the-relevant-respects beliefs on a particular topic simply does 
not ensure that one’s beliefs are well-suited to serve as input to practical reasoning 
toward successful action.  If this claim is right, then adopting a characterization of the 
aim of belief in terms of truth is unmotivated by empirical considerations relevant to the 
proper function or purpose of the cognitive system and so the constitutive aim of our 
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cognitive performances.  Thus, for the epistemologist who is committed to the 
methodology that I have adopted here, such a move involves an objectionable departure 
from the accepted methodological approach.  If one accepts the methodology outlined 
above, one should accept the pragmatically-driven characterization of the aim of belief 
and the resulting account of epistemic evaluation that I have developed here over rival 
accounts that spell out the constitutive aim of belief in terms of truth. 
 
2.4 
Before moving forward, I wish to briefly highlight a feature of the account that I 
have developed here that I think counts in its favor: the account of epistemic evaluation 
that I have offered is contextualist.  However, this account is contextualist in a way that 
differs from most traditional contextualist accounts of epistemic evaluation.  Specifically, 
the aim of our cognitive performances, as I have characterized it here, is context-
sensitive.  Our cognitive performances aim to supply input to practical reasoning that 
yields successful action.  However, I have cashed out successful action here in terms of 
desire or preference satisfaction and so the success of an action is, at least in part, 
determined by the particular preferences and desires of the organism performing the 
action.  Of course, different organisms may well have different desires or preferences and 
a single organism’s desires or preferences may change over time.  So, whether or not a 
particular action counts as successful depends on facts about the actor at the particular 
time that she is performing the action.  Thus, a fully specified characterization of the aim 
of the performances of any particular cognitive system will depend on facts about the 
preferences and desires of the organism within which that cognitive system operates at a 
certain point in time. 
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Most contextualist accounts build context sensitivity into their account of 
knowledge by building context sensitivity into their account of justification.  
Furthermore, traditional accounts often justify the context-sensitivity of their views 
simply by citing the fact that their contextualist accounts better capture how we speak and 
think about justification and knowledge in our everyday lives.  The view on offer here 
builds context-sensitivity into the account of epistemic evaluation at a more fundamental 
level (at the level of characterizing the aim of our cognitive performances).  As a result, 
both the account of accurate belief and the account of adroit belief (justified belief) I have 
developed here inherit a kind of context-sensitivity from the context-sensitivity built in to 
aim of our cognitive performances.  An accurate belief is just a cognitive performance 
that meets its aim, and so whether or not a particular belief counts as accurate depends on 
the particular context-sensitive aim of that cognitive performance.  Similarly, adroit 
belief is just belief that manifests cognitive skill.  However, since a cognitive habit or 
process counts as a cognitive skill to the degree that it reliably produces cognitive 
performances that meet their aim, and since the aim of any particular cognitive 
performance is context-sensitive, whether or not a particular cognitive habit or process 
counts as a cognitive skill will also be somewhat context sensitive.23  As a result, the 
view I advance shares the advantage of other contextualist accounts in vindicating our 
everyday way of thinking and speaking about knowledge and justification.  However, the 
account of epistemic evaluation on offer here supplies a more principled justification for 
                                                
23 That said, I am sympathetic to the idea that cognitive skills and so epistemic norms are 
appropriately characterized in broad enough terms and at a high enough level of 
abstraction so that the context-sensitivity of the particular aim of our cognitive 
performances does not generate pervasive context-sensitivity in the epistemologist’s 
account of epistemic norms. 
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its contextualism by locating context-sensitivity in the empirically discoverable aim of 
our cognitive performances.  
 
 3. Considering Objections 
 
I have tried to show that if one adopts the methodology on offer here, then one 
should also adopt the account of epistemic evaluation that I have developed above.  In 
what follows, I aim to defuse two related lines of objection to the account of epistemic 
evaluation I have sketched above.  Both lines of resistance are, at their cores, attempts to 
argue that truth-based accounts of epistemic evaluation have some decisive, scale-tipping 
virtue that the pragmatically-driven account on offer here lacks.  It is worth making 
explicit that I will not consider objections to the methodological approach that I have 
adopted here—I take commitment to this methodology as my starting point.  Thus, my 
goal in defusing each of these objections is to bolster my claim that if one adopts the 
methodological approach outlined in Section 1, then one should prefer the pragmatically-
driven account developed in Section 2 to an account of epistemic evaluation cashing out 
the aim of belief in terms of truth.   
 
3.1 
In “The Rationality of Belief and Some Other Propositional Attitudes”, Kelly 
defends the claim that practical considerations cannot rationalize belief.24  Put in other 
terms, Kelly’s thesis is that the consequences of holding any particular belief do not and 
                                                
24 Kelly does not take himself here to have supplied a thorough defense of this claim, but 
rather to have laid out compelling support for this thesis and, by so doing, to have shifted 
the burden of proof to his opposition.  In what follows, I hope to discharge this burden by 
describing how practical considerations play a role in rationalizing beliefs.  
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cannot directly affect whether it is rational for a subject to hold that belief.25  At least at 
first blush, Kelly’s thesis seems at odds with the account of epistemic evaluation that I 
developed above.  This account grounds the normative force of epistemic evaluation in 
the constitutive aim of belief: beliefs aim to be well-suited to serve as input to practical 
reasoning toward successful action.  Thus, according to the account on offer here, the 
source of the normative force of epistemic evaluations is characterized in thoroughly 
pragmatic or practical terms.  As a result, since an account of rational belief is simply an 
account of a particular kind of epistemic evaluation, practical considerations will 
necessarily, on this account, figure prominently in an explanation of when and why a 
subject’s belief that P counts as rational.  In what follows, I aim to undermine Kelly’s 
claim that practical considerations are irrelevant the rationality of any particular belief, 
and expose precisely where Kelly’s defense of this claim fails, by articulating the 
particular role that practical considerations play in rationalizing beliefs in the account of 
epistemic evaluation developed above.  
Kelly claims that only the grounds on which a belief is based can play a role in 
determining the rationality of that belief.  Thus, for Kelly, whether or not a subject is 
rational in believing that P is settled by consideration of the particular grounds on which 
the subject’s belief that P is based.  If the subject believes that P on the basis of adequate 
grounds, then the subject is rational in believing that P.  It is, on Kelly’s view, precisely 
and exclusively the adequate grounds on which the subject’s belief is based that 
rationalize her belief that P.   
                                                
25 Of course, Kelly admits that the expected consequences of holding a particular belief 
may figure in a complete story detailing the causal history of the belief.  
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Kelly goes on to argue that beliefs cannot be based on practical considerations.  In 
so doing, Kelly suggests that one can determine the considerations upon which a subject 
bases her belief that P by discovering what sorts of considerations might prompt the 
subject to give up her belief that P.  In Kelly’s words, “[t]he considerations on which a 
given belief (or course of action) is based are revealed by the circumstances which would 
prompt one to abandon that belief (or course of action).”26  Kelly goes on to point out 
that, at least as a matter of empirical fact, becoming aware of certain likely consequences 
of believing that P does not prompt a subject to revise her credence in P or abandon her 
belief that P.  Becoming aware of certain likely consequences of believing that P may 
prompt the subject to take action aimed at indirectly influencing her belief that P.  
However, a subject will not revise or abandon her belief that P directly in response to a 
change in the relevant practical considerations.  Kelly takes this fact as strong evidence 
for his claim that beliefs cannot be based on practical considerations.  Thus, since on 
Kelly’s view, the nature of the grounds on which a belief is based settle the questions of 
whether the belief is rationally held, Kelly concludes that practical considerations cannot 
play a role in rationalizing belief.     
In brief outline, Kelly’s argument for the claim that practical considerations 
cannot rationalize belief is as follows:  
Premise 1: The nature of the grounds on which a subject’s belief that P is 
based settles the question of whether the subject rationally believes that P.  
 
Premise 2: Practical considerations cannot serve as the grounds on which 
a subject’s belief that P is based. 
 
Conclusion: Practical considerations play no role in rationalizing belief. 
 
                                                
26 Kelly, T. (2002), 176. 
28 
If Kelly is right that practical considerations cannot serve as the grounds on which a 
subject bases her belief and that the nature of a subject’s grounds for belief settles the 
question of whether to subject’s belief is rational, then follows that practical 
considerations cannot directly affect whether it is rational for a subject to believe that P.  
However, in what follows I hope to show that Kelly is wrong to think that only the 
grounds on which a subject bases her belief can rationalize the belief.27  In so doing, I 
aim to undermine Kelly’s conclusion that practical considerations do not impact the 
rationality of any particular belief.  Thus, although Kelly may well be right in claiming 
that practical considerations cannot serve as the grounds on which a subject bases her 
belief, I aim to show that practical considerations do, nevertheless, play a crucial role in 
rationalizing beliefs.  
Recall that, on the view I have been advancing here, a belief is rationally held if 
and only if the belief is adroit or manifests a kind of cognitive skill.  That is, a subject 
rationally believes that P just in case her belief is the product or output of a cognitive 
process that reliably generates beliefs that meet their performative aim.  So, a subject’s 
belief that P is rational just when the belief is the product of a cognitive process that 
reliably produces beliefs that are well-suited to serve as input to practical reasoning 
issuing in successful action.  In order to determine whether or not a particular belief is 
rational, then, one must first discover which cognitive process gave rise to the belief, and 
then check to see whether or not the cognitive process in question is one that reliably 
generates beliefs well-suited to serve as input to practical reasoning yielding successful 
                                                
27 I suspect that one might well resist the particular account of epistemic evaluation I 
have advanced above and yet, nevertheless, successfully adopt precisely this strategy in 
objecting to Kelly’s argument here.  
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action.  A cognitive process is individuated, at least in part, by which inputs or types of 
input the process takes as arguments—sorts of grounds upon which the output (belief) 
will be based.  So, identifying the particular cognitive process that generates a given 
belief involves identifying the inputs or grounds upon which that belief is based.  As a 
result, the grounds on which a subject’s belief that P is based play a crucial role in 
rationalizing the subject’s belief.  However, facts establishing that the cognitive process 
generating the subject’s belief that P is a reliable one also play an equally crucial role in 
rationalizing the subject’s particular belief that P.  Determining whether the cognitive 
process that gives rise to a particular belief reliably generates beliefs that meet their 
performative aim involves checking to see if beliefs formed on the basis of a certain sort 
of input are likely to guide action successfully.  That is, the consequences of forming 
beliefs in a particular manner—the consequences of employing a particular cognitive 
process to form beliefs in a certain domain—determine whether beliefs formed 
accordingly are well-suited to serve as input to practical reasoning guiding successful 
action.  Thus, the consequences of forming beliefs through the operation of a particular 
cognitive process dictate whether forming beliefs in the given domain through the 
operation of this cognitive process manifests a kind of cognitive skill.  Paradigmatically 
practical considerations—information regarding the consequences of forming beliefs in a 
given domain through the operation of a certain cognitive process—play a crucial role in 
determining whether or not a particular belief that P, formed through the operation of the 
cognitive process in question and so on the basis of certain sorts of grounds, is rationally 
held.  More succinctly, practical considerations play a role in rationalizing belief by 
determining when the grounds on which a belief is based count as adequate.  Therefore, 
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on the view of epistemic evaluation I have been advancing here, practical considerations 
do figure prominently in an account of when and why a particular belief is rational even 
if, as Kelly suggests, they cannot ground beliefs.  
 
3.2 
There is a second intimately related and perhaps more fundamental line of 
resistance to the account of epistemic evaluation developed above that I wish to address 
here.  The objector adopting this line of resistance maintains that any account of 
epistemic evaluation must be capable of sustaining a substantive distinction between two 
different normative domains: the epistemic domain and the practical or pragmatic 
domain.  She goes on to suggest that the account of epistemic evaluation I am advancing 
here fails to carve out an independent, distinctively epistemic domain of normative 
evaluation and, instead, merely subsumes epistemic evaluation as a species of pragmatic 
or practical evaluation.  Put another way, the objector claims that the account of 
epistemic evaluation that I am advancing here lacks the resources to underwrite or 
vindicate a substantive distinction between epistemic evaluation and practical evaluation.   
In fact, I suspect it is precisely this line of thinking that motivates Kelly’s efforts 
to defend the claim that practical considerations cannot rationalize belief.  In his 
introduction, Kelly makes explicit that he is concerned “with the fact that one can 
evaluate one’s own beliefs practically as well as epistemically.”28  Additionally, I suspect 
that it is precisely this line of thought that motivates certain epistemologists to 
characterize the performative aim of beliefs in terms of truth rather than in pragmatic 
                                                
28 Kelly (2002), 164. 
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terms as I have proposed.29  It seems that epistemologists of this mind count the fact that 
accounts cashing out the aim of belief in terms of truth straightforwardly carve out an 
independent domain of distinctively epistemic evaluation as a decisive virtue of such 
accounts.  My aim here is to undermine this line of resistance to the pragmatically-driven 
account of epistemic evaluation I have been advancing here by showing that this account 
does, in fact, have the resources to mark out a domain of distinctively epistemic 
evaluation.   
The source of this objector’s worry that the account of epistemic evaluation on 
offer here falls short in this respect is that, according to this account, the source of the 
normative force of epistemic evaluations is, at its core, pragmatic in character.  Recall 
that on the methodological approach I have adopted here, it is the constitutive aim of 
belief that gives epistemic evaluation—evaluation with respect to this aim—normative 
force.  Moreover, as I have characterized it above, the constitutive aim of belief is a 
paradigmatically pragmatic one.  Thus, the account of epistemic evaluation I am 
advancing here explains the normative force of our epistemic evaluations by pointing to 
the fact that performances of the cognitive system necessarily aim to be well-suited to 
serve as input to practical reasoning generating successful action.  At least at first blush, 
then, the objector’s accusation seems to stick.  It seems that, on the account I have been 
advancing here, epistemic evaluation is, at bottom, merely a particular species of 
practical evaluation.   
                                                
29 I am thinking here, in particular, of Shah and Velleman, and, although it is more 
difficult to tell, perhaps Sosa as well. 
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Perhaps it will be helpful in fleshing out the objector’s line of resistance to revisit 
the case of the overly optimistic athlete.30  Recall again the swimmer who, in the face of 
evidence suggesting otherwise, believes that she has a reasonable shot at winning a race.  
Even if one accepts that it is better, all things considered, for the swimmer to believe as 
she does, the objector claims that one can and should still maintain that the swimmer’s 
belief is epistemically unjustified and/or epistemically irrational.  In developing the 
account of epistemic evaluation that I have been advancing here, of course, I denied 
precisely this claim.  I suggested that there is no sense in which the swimmer does 
something wrong in believing as she does.  That is, the swimmer’s overly optimistic 
belief, I maintained, is not a belief the holding of which under the specified 
circumstances merits any sort of criticism leveled with genuine normative force.  Thus, 
the account I have been advancing here cannot support the claim that the swimmer’s 
belief is epistemically unjustified, although, perhaps, practically rational and, all things 
considered, the belief that she should hold under the circumstances.  Put another way, this 
pragmatically-driven account cannot vindicate an analysis of the swimmer’s case 
maintaining that the swimmer’s belief is epistemically faulty, but practically sound.  It is 
this sort of observation, I suspect, that prompts the objector to resist the account of 
epistemic evaluation I have been advancing here on the grounds that this account lacks 
the resources to underwrite a substantive distinction between epistemic and practical 
evaluation.   
                                                
30 Kelly, in fact, briefly discusses precisely this case in setting up his own view (see Kelly 
(2002), 164).  Kelly suggests here that the athlete’s overly optimistic belief is irrational, 
although perhaps practically sound.  
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I will argue that analyzing the swimmer’s overly optimistic belief as epistemically 
faulty, but practically sound, is deeply problematic.  After all, I have suggested that it is 
an advantage of the account that I have been advancing here that it avoids commitment to 
this sort of analysis of the swimmer’s overly optimistic belief.  Furthermore, I hope to 
show that the objector is overly hasty in concluding, on the grounds that the account of 
epistemic evaluation on offer here cannot vindicate such an analysis of the swimmer’s 
overly optimistic belief, for example, that this account lacks the resources to mark out an 
independent and distinctively epistemic domain of normative evaluation.  
Before articulating the way in which the account I have been advancing here 
circumscribes a normative domain of distinctively epistemic evaluation, I will briefly 
suggest why I find the sort of analysis of the swimmer’s overly optimistic belief 
maintaining that the swimmer’s belief is epistemically faulty unpalatable.  Recall the 
intuitive plausibility of the claims that in holding her overly optimistic belief, the 
swimmer believes exactly as she should and that the swimmer does nothing wrong and so 
does not deserve criticism or reproach in believing as she does.  These claims have 
normative force. That is, this way of evaluating the swimmer’s overly optimistic belief 
guides the way we think and act in responding to the case.  Not only do we refrain from 
criticizing the swimmer for believing as she does, but we often actively encourage her to 
maintain her overly optimistic belief in the face of defeating evidence.  So, if, as the 
objector here suggests, the swimmer’s overly optimistic belief is epistemically faulty and 
merits criticism, then the epistemic status of the swimmer’s belief carries little or no 
normative weight.  Analyzing the swimmer’s overly optimistic belief as epistemically 
faulty, but pragmatically sound, robs the epistemic evaluation of the swimmer’s case of 
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any noteworthy normative or action-guiding force.  So, if the objector is right in claiming 
that the swimmer’s belief is epistemically faulty, then it follows that our epistemic 
evaluation of the swimmer’s belief is impotent with respect to informing or influencing 
how we act in response to the swimmer’s case.  After all, we are not moved to act as if 
there is something wrong with the swimmer’s believing as she does.  Thus, I suggest that 
one should reject analyses of the swimmer’s overly optimistic belief maintaining that the 
belief is epistemically faulty on the grounds that such analyses undercut the normative 
force of epistemic evaluation.  
It is a fact that the pragmatically-driven account of epistemic evaluation I have 
been defending here will not vindicate the claims like the claim that the swimmer’s 
overly optimistic belief is epistemically faulty.  However, contra the objector adopting 
the line of resistance described above, I maintain that this fact is not symptomatic of the 
account’s inability to vindicate the platitudinous thought that the epistemic evaluation is 
distinct from a kind of practical evaluation.  In what follows, I sketch an explanation that 
an epistemologist who wishes to take on what I have proposed above might flesh out in 
an effort to show that her pragmatically-driven account of epistemic evaluation can 
underwrite a substantive distinction between epistemic and practical evaluation.  My aim 
here is not to develop this explanation in detail, but rather to shift the burden of proof to 
the objector who endeavors to push this line of resistance against this account.  
Recall that, on the account of epistemic evaluation I have been advancing here, to 
engage in epistemic evaluation is just to evaluate the performances of the cognitive 
system with respect to their particular constitutive aim.  So, at the very least, the objects 
of epistemic evaluation are well-defined and distinctive: epistemic evaluation evaluates 
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the performances of the cognitive system (i.e. beliefs).  Moreover, epistemic evaluation is 
necessarily evaluation with respect to the particular performative aim of these 
performances.  That is, epistemic evaluation is necessarily evaluation with respect to 
whether a performance is (accuracy) or is likely to be (adroitness) well-suited to serve as 
input to practical reasoning yielding action that fulfills certain desires or needs.  Thus, as 
I have argued above, pragmatic considerations will necessarily play some role in an 
account explaining when and why certain of our beliefs have positive epistemic status.31   
However, there is no reason to think that pragmatic considerations will play an 
analogous role in an account of practical evaluation.  The epistemologist adopting the 
account of epistemic evaluation that I have been advancing here can characterize 
practical evaluation as, at least in the first instance, evaluation of actions (or, perhaps, 
intentions to act).  On the account that I have been advancing here, actions are 
appropriately understood as the output of practical reasoning and so an action is 
successful or meets its aim precisely when it satisfies those desires or needs that motivate 
the action (i.e. those desires or needs that served as input to the bit of practical reasoning 
generating the action in question as output).  So, engaging in practical evaluation 
involves evaluating an action with respect to whether the action, in fact, satisfies those 
desires that motivated the performance of the action, or whether the action is likely to 
satisfy these desires.  As a result, the norms governing practical evaluation will be 
crucially different in character from the norms governing epistemic evaluation.  Norms 
governing epistemic evaluation—and, in particular, adroit belief—will, roughly speaking, 
have the following form: employ cognitive process p (specified, in part, by the sorts of 
                                                
31 I hope that what I have said in 3.1 helps to make clear what this role will be. 
36 
grounds on which beliefs generated by this cognitive process are based) in circumstances 
c to form beliefs that are suitable to serve as input to practical reasoning with respect to 
domain z.  However, norms governing practical evaluation—and, in particular, adroit 
action—will, again, roughly speaking, have the following alternate form: if one has 
beliefs b1…bn, then perform an action of type a to satisfy desires of type d.  Thus, 
epistemic norms specify when a particular sort of performance (i.e. a belief) is likely to 
lead an organism to perform an action that satisfies certain of its desires, while practical 
norms specify when an organism’s performance (in the first instance, an action) is likely 
to satisfy whichever of the organism’s desires motivate that performance.  On this 
account, both epistemic and practical evaluation is, at bottom, pragmatically-driven.  
However, practical considerations play crucially different roles in specifying epistemic 
and practical norms. 
I have emphasized that practical evaluation, according to this view, is, at least in 
the first instance, evaluation of actions or intentions to act.  Nevertheless, one can easily 
imagine using practical norms to evaluate beliefs.32  When one does evaluate a belief 
with respect to both practical and epistemic norms, it is entirely possible for the epistemic 
and the practical evaluations of the belief to come apart.  Imagine that a soldier has gone 
missing and, after some time, the military contacts the soldier’s wife to inform her that 
her husband is missing and presumed dead.  Upon hearing this news, it seems reasonable 
to assume that either the soldier’s wife will form the belief that her husband is dead or the 
soldier’s wife will come to believe that her husband is missing and possibly still alive.  
On the account of epistemic evaluation that I have been advancing here, if the wife comes 
                                                
32 Although, doing so would, perhaps, be misguided in certain respects. 
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to believe that her husband is dead, then her belief will have positive epistemic status.  
One can easily imagine that the wife’s belief that her husband is dead is formed in a way 
that reliably generates beliefs that are well-suited to serve as input to practical reasoning 
issuing in successful action.  After all, forming beliefs on the basis of expert testimony is 
plausibly quite reliable in this respect.  Thus, the wife’s belief that her husband is dead is 
adroit.  Moreover, it is plausible that the wife’s belief that her husband is dead is, itself, 
well-suited to serve as input to practical reasoning toward successful action and so the 
belief is accurate.  So, from an epistemic perspective, one must say that the wife should 
believe that her husband is dead.  However, it is plausible that, from the practical 
perspective I have sketched above, it would be best for the wife to believe that her 
husband is possibly still alive since holding this belief, one can easily imagine, would 
satisfy the wife’s immediate desires far more effectively than would holding the belief 
that the soldier is dead.  In particular, it is plausible that the wife wants to believe that her 
husband is alive and, in fact, it is easy to imagine that the wife comes to believe that her 
husband is still alive precisely because so believing satisfies this desire.  That is, one can 
easily imagine that the wife’s belief is the result of wishful thinking.  If, as I have 
suggested, this is a case in which epistemic evaluation recommends believing one 
thing—namely, that the soldier is dead—and practical evaluation recommends believing 
otherwise—namely, believing that the soldier is possibly still alive—then it should be 
clear that the account in question can underwrite a substantive distinction between 
epistemic and practical evaluation.   
I have tried to sketch a way in which an epistemologist adopting the account of 
epistemic evaluation that I have been advancing here might vindicate the intuition that 
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practical evaluation and epistemic evaluation are fundamentally different and so can, at 
least in some case, yield divergent recommendations with respect to what one should 
believe.  I hope that what I have said here is sufficient to undermine the objector’s claim 
that the account on offer here lacks the resources to circumscribe a normative domain of 
distinctively epistemic evaluation.  If I have been successful in this effort, then the 
epistemologist who endorses the methodology outlined above should not resist adopting 
the pragmatically-driven account of epistemic evaluation that I have been advancing here 
instead of an account that cashes out the constitutive aim of belief in terms of truth. 
 
 Conclusion 
In this paper, I have tried to show that if one adopts the methodological approach 
to epistemic inquiry outlined in Section 1, then one should also adopt the pragmatically-
driven account of epistemic evaluation developed in Section 2 and defended in Section 3.  
The methodology on offer here understands beliefs as performances of the cognitive 
system and so maintains that account of epistemic evaluation—evaluation of beliefs—
should be grounded in an account, given in general terms, of the way in which 
performances are appropriately evaluated.  According to this methodological approach, 
performances are appropriately evaluated with reference to their constitutive aims.  Thus, 
the epistemologist adopting this approach develops an account of epistemic evaluation by 
referencing the constitutive aim of belief.  On the methodological approach on offer here, 
the constitutive aim of the performances of an organ system operating within an organism 
is derived from the empirically discoverable proper function of that system.  I have 
argued here that empirical data supports the claim that the proper function of the 
cognitive system is to provide input to practical reasoning in a way that engenders 
successful action and so beliefs—understood as performances of the cognitive system—
aim to be well-suited to serve as input to practical reasoning yielding successful action.  I 
employed this characterization of the aim of belief in developing an account of epistemic 
evaluation here that cashes out accurate, adroit, and apt belief in pragmatic terms, and 
then tried to defuse two related lines of resistance to the resulting pragmatically-driven 
account of epistemic evaluation by articulating the particular role that practical 
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considerations will play in specifying epistemic norms and showing that the account on 
offer here has the resources to circumscribe a normative domain of distinctively 
epistemic evaluation.  In so doing, I have hoped to establish that the pragmatically-driven 
account of epistemic evaluation developed above, rather than accounts that cash out 
epistemic evaluation in terms of a truth-goal, is the account that results if one rigorously 
and carefully put into practice the methodology on offer here.  If I have been successful, 
then the epistemologist must either reject this methodological approach to epistemic 
inquiry or accept the account of epistemic evaluation that I have developed and defended 
here. 
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